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HELEN E. OTTO, Appellant, v. UNION NATIONAL 
BANK OF PASADENA et aI., Respondents. 
(la,lb] Perpetuities-Suspension of Power of Alienation.-Where 
trustor, by a trust indenture, has reservt'd a life estate in 
herself and has created a future estate in a class which 
includes all her children in being at her <leath and the lineal 
descendants of any deceased child, 'lIld which may includ" 
children born after execution and delivery of the trust instru-
ment, a clause requiring the share of a minor child to be 
retained in trust until he attains his majority is void as sus-
pending thtl absolute power of alienation beyond the con-
tinuance of "lives in being at the creation of the limitation 
or condition." (Civ. Code, § 715.) 
[2] Id.-Suspension of Power of Alienation.-Power of a trustee 
to sell trust property and reinvest the proceeds does not 
relieve the trust froll the inhibitions of Civ. Code, § 715, sus-
pending the power of alienation beyond the time therein 
provided. 
[8] Id.-Suspension of Power of Alienation.-Absolute power of 
alienation is equivalent to power of conveying an absolute fee. 
(Civ. Code, § 716.) 
[4] Trusts-Express Trusts-Partial Invalidity.-Rule that valid 
trusts should not be disregarded because in the instrument 
creating them one particular invalid trust is declared, unless 
the latter is so inseparably blended with the others that it 
cannot be eliminated without destroying the trustor's main 
intent or working manifest injustice to other beneficiaries, 
has application only to a case where there are two or more 
dispositions, some of which are valid and others void. 
[6] Id.-Express Trusts-Doctrine of M~difying Olauses.-Doc-
trine of modifying clauses permits a gift to be valid in spite 
of the imposition of an invalid qualification thereof, if the 
gift and qualification are verbally separable; it is a rule of 
construction employed to effectuate, insofar as possible, the 
trustor's intention. 
[6] Id.-Express Trusts-Doctrine of Modifying OlauseB.-Under 
the doctrine of modifying clauses, where trustor, after pro-
viding for a life estate in herself, declared that on her death 
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 1042; 41 Am.Jur. 69. 
[4] See 25 Cal.Jur. 298; 54 Am.Jur. 39. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Perpetuities, § 11; [3] Perpetuit.ies, 
§ 4; [4, 5] Trusts, § 74; [6,7] Trusts, § 75. 
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more on Evidence [3d ed., 1940] 550 et seq.) In applying this 
principle it has bet>ll beld that an accused person in custody 
of the law is entitled to consult with his attorney in private, 
without the presence of the sheriff or other representatives of 
the state. (1n re Qualls, 58 Ca1.App.2d 330 [136 P.2d 341] ; 
In re Snyder, 62 Cal.App. 697 [217 P. 777] ; In re Rider, 50 
Cal.App. 797 [195 P. 965] ; State v. Davis, 9 Okla.Crim. 94 
[130 P. 962, 963-964, 44 L.R.A.N.S. 1083] ; Turner v. State, 
91 Tex.Crim. 627 [241 S.W. 162, 163-164, 23 A.L.R. 1378]; 
see 14 Am.Jur. 885-886.) For the same basic reasons of 
policy, the client is accorded a privilege against disclosure 
of private conversations with his attorney (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1881, subd. 2; Verdelli v. Gray's Harbor etc. Co., 115 Cal. 
517,525-526 [47 P. 364]; see 8 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed., 
1940] 550 et seq.) 
The right of private consultation has been held to include 
interviews through an interpreter chosen by accused where 
the services of an interpreter are required. (Louie Yung v. 
Coleman, 5 F.Supp. 702; see People v. Larrios, 220 Cal. 236, 
249-250 [30 P.2d 404].) This court has also held that where 
medical advice is required to interpret a client's condition to 
his attorney, the information discovered upon a private exam-
ination of the client by a physician employed by the attorney 
falls within the scope of the rule protecting communications 
between attorney and client. (City & County of San Fran. 
cisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.2d 227 [231 P.2d 26] [holding 
that the physician could not be compelled to testify with re-
spect to his examination].) [3] Since the same general pol-
icy underlies both the right to consultation in private and the 
privilege against disclosure, it follows that where, as here, 
petitioner's attorney requires a psychiatrist's aid in inter-
preting her mental condition, she is entitled to have the psy-
chiatrist examinE her in private. 
[4] There is, however, no showing that the information 
under which she is charged is insufficient or that she cannot 
properly be held for trial if sIle is afforded the relief discussed 
above. Accordingly, the order to show cause is discharged 
(see In re McCoy, 32 Ca1.2d 73, 76-77 [194 P.2d 531]), and 
the sheriff is directed to allow a private examination of peti-
tioner by an alienist or alienists selected by petitioner or her 
counsel. 
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
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the trust Ilhould terminate, and made an absolute gift of the 
corpus by creating a future estate in a class composed of her 
issu~ per stirpes, but after making this gift attempted to 
modify that pro,,"ision by a subsequent and invalid qualifica-
tion as to the gift to those of her children who might not, 
at termination of the trust, have attained their majority, 
such modification of the otherwise valid gift is verbally sepa-
rable from the prior absolute gift and can be eliminated 
without destroyinj? the trustor's main intent. 
[7] Id.-Express Trusts-Doctrine of Modifying Clauses.-Con-
struction of Ii trust indenture so as tc permit, under doctrine 
of modifying clauses. a gift of the corpus of a trust to trustor's 
issue per stirpes to be valid in spite uf the imposition of an 
invalid qualification thereof as to those of her children who 
might not, at termination of the trust, have attained their 
majority, does not violate Civ. Code, § 716, declaring that 
"every future interest is void" which may suspend the absolute 
power of alienation, since the qualifying clause of the trust 
instrument did not create the future interest, but merely quali-
fied an interest previously created by the trustor's gift of the 
corpus to her issue. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Kenneth C. Newell, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to terminate a trust. Judgment for defendants on 
sustaining demurrers to complaint which plaintiff failed to 
amend, affirmed. 
George Penney, Dunlap, Holmes, R{)ss & Woodson and 
Robert H. Dunlap for Appellant. 
Hahn & Hahn, Delbridge, Hamblin & Linton, Leon W. 
Delbridge and Donald W. Hamblin for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-By this action, Helen Otto seeks to termi-
nate an inter vivos trust created by her. The appeal is from 
a judgment which followed an order sustaining general de-
murrers to her complaint which she failed to amend. 
In 1941, Helen Otto, then Helen Wheeler, created an inter 
vivos trust with a corpus consisting of assets in excess of 
$500,000, which was her separate property. The trust inden-
ture includes a spendthrift provision ill favor of the trustor 
and requires the payment of the income to her for life. 
Paragraph IV of the declaration of trust provides that upon 
the death of the trustor, the trust Iiliall terminate, and the 
) 
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entire trust estate shall be distributed according to the 
trustor's will. If Mrs. Otto "should fail to exercise this 
power of appointment," according to the terms of the trust, 
the corpus shall go "in equal shares to her issue per stirpes 
and if there be no issue to her heirs at law in accordance with 
the Statutes of Succession of the State of California then in 
effect. Should any child of Trustor be under the age of 
twenty-one (21) years upon the termination of this trust and, 
by reason of Trustor's exercise or failure to exercise her power 
of appointment herein provided be entitled to have distributed 
to him or her a portion of the then corpus of the Trust Estate 
and the undistributed income therefrom, said Trustees shall 
retain his or her share thereof until he or she becomes 
twenty-one (21) years of age, when the same shall be dis-
tributed to him or her, but said Trustees shall distribute the 
income of said share accruing after the death of Trustor to 
or for the benefit of said minor child until he or she becomes 
twenty-one (21) years of age." 
Following the trustor's divorce from John Wheeler, the 
trustees named in the indenture were removed and the Union 
National Bank of Pasadena was named successor trustee. 
When the present action for declaratory relief and termina-
tion of the trust was filed, the trustor was 43 years of age 
and had two sons, Evans Wheeler, age 22 years, and Gordon 
'Vbeeler, age 20 years. Gordon was then unmarried. Evans 
was married and the father of two minor children, Scott 
and Stephanie. In her complaint, Mrs. Otto asks for a judg-
ment that she is the sole and absolute owner of all assets 
of the trust, that the trustee be ordered to transfer and convey 
to her all assets of the trust, and that it be adjudged that 
the trust was never valid, or that she bas full power of 
revocation, or that it has terminated by reason of the accom-
plishment of its purposes. 
Upon his failure to appear, the default of EYans Wheeler 
was entered. The general demurrers of the trustee and the 
minor children were sustained with leave to amend. Upon the 
trustor's failure to do so, judgment was entered accordingly. 
Belen Otto now argues that the trust was void in its in-
ception because Paragraph IV creates a suspension of the 
absolute power of aliE-nation in violation of sections 715 and 
771 of the Civil Code. Assuming tlJat the trust so suspends 
the power of alienation, the ,"oid portion is not severable 
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she is the sole beneficiary of the trust and entitled to termi-
nate it. 
Insofar as pertinent to the issues of this case, section 715 
of the Civil Code provides that the absolute power of aliena-
tion cannot be suspended by any limitation or conditiion 
for a longer period than .. during the continuance of the 
lives of persons in being at the creation of the limitation or 
condition .... " Section 716 declares: "Every future interest 
is void in its creation which, by any possibility, may suspend 
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than 
is prescribed in this chapter. Such power of alienation is 
suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an 
absolute interest in possession can be conveyed." 
[Ia] In the present case, the trustor has created a future 
interest in a class, designated as "issue per stirpes," which in-
cludes all of her children in being at her death and the lineal 
descendants of any deceased child. It is clear, from the 
language of the trust indenture, that the class may includt> 
children born after the execution and delivery of the trust 
instrument. Unquestionably, therefore, the clause requiring 
the share of a minor child to be retained in trust until he 
attains his majority suspends the absolute power of aliena-
tion beyond the continuance of ". . . lives in being at the 
creation of the limitation or condition ..•. " (Civ. Code, 
§ 715.) As this court firmly stated in Sheean v. Michel, 6 
Cal.2d 324, 327 [57 P.2d 127], "If the trust thus attempted 
to be created is by its terms designed to be continued during 
the minorities of children born after the delivery of the trust 
instrument, it is obvious that the instrument creates a sus-
pension of the power of alienation in violation of the provi-
sions of section 715 of the Civil Code." (To the same effect is 
Estate of Troy, 214 Cal. 53,56 [3 P.2d 930], and see the eases 
cited therein.) 
To avoid the rule of these decisions, the respondents argue 
that the rule against the suspension of the power of alienation 
is not violated if, at the expiration of a life in being at the 
creation of the trust, there are persons in being by whom 
an absolute interest in possession can be conveyed. Under 
the terms of the trust here being considered, say the respond. 
ents, at the death of the trustor, and in the absence of a 
testamentary disposition by her, there will be ascertamable 
persons in being who may unite to convey an absolute interest 
in possession, although such persons may be minor children 
Dec. 1951] OTTO v. UNION NATIONAL BANK 
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of the appellant for whose benefit the trust is to continue 
until they reach majority. 
[2] However, contrary to the position taken by the re-
spondents, the power of the trustee to sell the trust property 
and reinvest the proceeds would not have the effect of re-
lieving the trust from the inhibitions of the Civil Code. As 
stated in Estate of MaltmaTl, 195 Cal. 643, 652 l234 P. 898], 
their argument is fully met by the provisions of section 771 
of the Civil Code, which read as follows: "The suspension 
of all power to alienate the subject of a trust, other than 
a power to exchange it for other property to be held upon 
the same trust, or to sell it and reinvest the proceeds to be 
held upon the same trust, is a suspension of the power of 
alienation, within the meaning of section seven hundred and 
fifteen." [3] The absolute power of alienation is equivalent 
to the power of conveying an absolute fee. (Civ. Code, § 716; 
In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627, 647 [41 P. 772,49 Am.St.Rep. 
97J .) 
[1b] The respondents erroneously assume that the minor 
beneficiaries of the trust might convey their present rights 
to income and compel the trustee to convey the corpus as 
directed by them. This, however, they could not do until 
they attained majority (Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254 [149 
P. 555]), and the principles stated in the Walkerly case, 
supra, at pp. 648, 649, 658, are controlling. Applying the 
rule of that decision, the clause of the trust indenture estab-
lishing a trust for the minority of the trustor's children is 
void as creating a suspension of the absolute power of aliena-
tion beyond the time permitted by section 715 of the Civil Code. 
In a memorandum opinion, the trial court also reached this 
conclusion. However, it held that the challenged provision 
is not so inseparably blended with the other provisions of 
Paragraph IV "that it may not be cut off and the balance 
permitted to stand. tt The trustor takes issue with this latter 
statement. She contends that the rule of severability has no 
application to the facts of the present case. 
In Estate of Micheletti, 24 Ca1.2d 904,909 [151 P.2d 833], 
quoting from Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 11 [60 P. 471], it 
was said that "valid trusts should not be disregarded because 
in the instrument cre4ting them one particular invalid trust 
is declared, unless the latter is so inseparably blended with 
the others that it cannot be eliminated without destroying 
the main intent of the trustor, or working manifest injustice 
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tothe other beneficiaries." [4J The trustor correctly contE.'nds 
that this rule has application only to a case in which there 
are two or more dispositions, some of which are valid and 
others vold. That was the situation in the Willey case, wh<.>re 
the trust provided for the payment of income to the trustor 
for life and, on his death, the income to certain named 
beneficiaries. The testator also provided that, before making 
any payments of income under the trust, the trustees should 
set aside $25 and any further amount that might be reason· 
ably necessary for the care and preservation of a cemetery 
lot. The gift of income to maintain the cemetery lot was 
declared to be invalid, but severable from the remaining 
gifts. Similar applications of the doctrine are found in 
Nellis v. Rickard, 133 Cal. 617 [66 P. 32, 85 Am.St.Rep. 227]; 
Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 [190 P. 17] ; Estate of Troy, 
214 Cal. 53 [3 P.2d 930]; and Estate of Micheletti, supra. 
[6J However, closely allied to the rule of severability and 
often confused with it is the doctrine of modifying clauses 
which "permits a gift to be valid in spite of the imposition 
of an invalid qualification thereof, if the gift and qualifica-
tion are verbally separable." (Leach, Perpetuities in a Nut-
shell, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 635 j and see Towle v. Doe, 97 Me. 427 
[54 A. 1072]; Sears v. Putnam, 102 Mass. 5.) Essentially, 
it is a rule of construction employed to effectuate, insofar 
as possible, the intention of the trustor. "The particular 
ground on which the construction in question is rested is, 
that the author of the limitations intends the prior absolute 
gift to prevail, except so far only as it is effectually super-
seded by the subsequent qualifying one." (Gray, The Rule 
Against Perpetuities [4th ed.] § 423, p. 437; 1 Jarman on 
Wills [6th ed.}, pp. 292-294.} 
[6] Under the doctrine of modifying clauses, the question 
is: .o\t the time of creating the trust, had Mrs. Otto known 
that the qualification by way of the provisions for a second 
trust during the minority of her children would be declared 
invalid, what would she have intended Y Her intention, insofar 
as it can be found in the trust instrument, is the controlling 
factor. Mrs. Otto made a full and detailed arrangement 
for the disposition of the trust estate. After providing for 
a life estate in hersclf, she declared that upon her death 
the trust should terminate. An absolute gift of the corpus 
was made by creating a future estate in a class composed 
of her issue per stirpes. The trust instrument provides that 
if she dies leaving issue and without having exercised her 
,) 
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power of appointment, " ... the entire Trust Estate, to-
gether with any income accrued or undistributed to said 
Trustor on the date of her death, shall be transferred, con-
veyed, delivered and distributed in cash or in kind ... in 
equal shares to her issue per stirpes. . . ." It was only after 
making this gift of the absolute remainder in fee that she 
attempted to modify that provision by a subsequent and 
invalid qualification as to the gift to those of her children 
who might not, at the termination of the trust, have attained 
their majority. Clearly, that modification of the otherwise 
valid gift is verbally separable from the prior absolute gift 
and can be eliminated without destroying the main intent 
of the trustor. 
[7] However, the trustor argues that such construction is 
not permitted under section 716 of the Civil Code which 
provides that every" future interest is void" which may sus-
pend the absolute power of alienation. To strike the qualifying 
clause, says the trustor, leaves the future interest freed from 
the restraint upon alienation in the contravention of section 
716 which declares that the "future interest," not the re-
straint, is void. 
This argument erroneously assumes that section 716 of 
the Civil Code precludes the application of any rule of con-
struction. No such intention on the part of the JJegislature 
may be read into the statute. The qualifying clause of the 
trust instrument did not create the future interest. It qualified 
an interest previously created by the direction to the trustee 
to convey the entire trust estate to the trustor's issue per 
stirpes. That interest in no way suspends the absolute power 
of alienation beyond the period permitted by section 715 
of the Civil Code. There is no reason for striking down the 
provision for an absolute gift of the corpus of the trust to 
the trustor's issue. These are valid remainder interests, and 
the trustor is not the sole beneficiary of the trust. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the result reached in the 
majority opinion. I do not aln"ee, however, that the trust 
instrument violates the rule against restraints on alienation. 
(Civ. Code, §§ 715, 716, 771.) . 
In my opinion the beneficiaries can convey an absolute 
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interest in possession upon the death of the settlor. The 
settlor has not suspended the beneficiaries' power of aliena-
tion by limitations taking effect after a life in being; there 
is nc provision making their interests contingent upon sur-
vhoal until majority or terminating the interest of issue that 
fail to reach majority. If the settlor does not otherwise 
dispose of the property by will, her issue will take vested 
interests in the corpus at her death. Furthermore, the trustor 
has not restrained the beneficiaries' power of alienation by 
means of a spendthrift clause as in Estate of Maltman, 195 
Cal. 643, 646 [234 P. 898]. Unless a trust instrument de-
clares otherwise, the benefica'ries are free to alienate their 
interests. (Civ. Code, § 867; Fatjo v. Swasey, 111 Cal. 628, 
637 [44 P. 225] ; see Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 27 Cal. 
2d 457, 463, 471 [165 P.2d 15].) 
The fact that some of the issue may be minors and thus 
incapable of executing a valid conveyance without court in-
tervention, will not make their interests inalienable within 
the meaning of the statutes. "The prohibition is against 
those limitations upon the power of alienation which may 
be imposed by dispositions of property, and not against limita-
tions made by the law upon the capacity to convey." (Estate 
of Campbell, 149 Cal. 712,718 [87 P. 573].) The minors may 
be unable to require the trustee to convey the corpus to 
them (Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 27 Cal.2d 457 [165 
P.2d 15]) during minority, but since the trust does not 
contain a spendthrift clause, they can convey their interests 
to a third party and thus transfer an absolute interest in 
possession. (Estate of Yates, 170 Cal. 254, 257 [149 P. 555].) 
At the death of the settlor, a life in being, the beneficiaries 
will thus not be restrained by the trust instrument from 
conveying thelr interests in the trust to a purchaser. The 
purchaser may terminate the trust and discharge the trustee. 
(Eakle v. Ingl'am, 142 Cal. 15 [75 P. 566, 100 Am.St.Rep. 99] ; 
see Moxley v. Title Ins. cf; Trust Co., 27 Ca1.2d 457, 465 [165 
P.2d 15].) The purchaser will then have the absolute interest 
in possession required by Civil Code, section 716. 
The trust is not within the prohibitions of Civil Code, 
section 771, which provides, "The suspension of all power 
to alienate the subject of a trust, other than a power to ex-
change it for other property to be held upon the same trust, 
or to sell it and reinvest the proceeds to be herd upon the 
same trust, is a suspension of the power of alienation, within 
the meaning of section seven hundred and fifteen." (Italics 
) 
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added.) In a spendthrift trust, where the beneficiaries cannot 
alienate their interests, this section would be relevant. It 
cannot be invoked in the present case, however, for the settlor 
has not suspended all power to alienate the subject of the 
trust. There is no spendthrift clause limiting the power of 
the beneficiaries to alienate their interests upon the death 
of the settlor. 
In re Walkerly, 108 Cal. 627 [41 P. 772, 49 Am.St.Rep. 
97], on which appellant relies, declared that a trust that 
might continue longer than the statutory period would violate 
the code provisions. The court stated that even if it were 
assumed that the interests of the beneficiary were vested and 
alienable, a beneficiary "could not alienate his interest within 
the trust period so as to avoid the statute. Such a trust 
cannot be terminated or destroyed during the period fixed 
for the existence, even by the consent and joint act of all 
the trustees and beneficiaries." (108 Cal. at 649.) The court 
relied on New York cases. Those cases, however, were based 
on a New York statute (L.R.S. 730, § 63, now McKinney's 
Consol. Laws of New York, Real Property Law, § 103) which, 
nntil1903, provided that the beneficiary of a New York trust 
could not assign or dispose of his interest. By contrast, Cali-
fornia beneficiaries of a trust not expressly limiting alien-
ability have been able to alienate their interests since Civil 
Code section 867 was amended in 1874. (Fatjo v. Swasey, 
111 Cal. 628, 637 [44 P. 225]. See discussion in Hohfeld, 
The Need of Remedial Legislation in the California Law of 
Trusts and Perpetuities, 1 Cal.L.Rev. 305, 320-328.) After 
transfer of the beneficial interests, the transferee would be 
able to terminate the trust under Eakle v. Ingram, mpra, 
142 Cal. 15, and would obtain an absolute interest in posses-
sion. 
The rule against restraints on alienation is not violated 
simply because of the duration of a trust. The rule is violated 
only when the beneficiaries are unable to convey an absolute 
interest in possession within the statutory period. Thus, 
sections 715 and 771 are a check upon the creation of long-
term trusts only when the interests of all beneficiaries do not 
become alienable within the allowable period of suspension. 
(See Turrentine, Suggestions for Revision of Prom'sions of 
the California Civil Code Regarding Future Interests, 21 Cal. 
L.Rev., 1, 19-22.) . 
The statements or holdings in the eases relied on in the 
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maj()rity opinion that a trust that continues beyond the 
statutory period must always ·fail are not justified under the 
Civil Code and should be disapproved or overruled. Of 
course, if restrictions in tbe trust instrument prevent transfer 
of an absolute inter('st in posses.',;ion, alienation is restrained 
in violation of the statute. But when, as here, the interests 
vest at the expiration of a life in being' at the time of creation 
of the trust, and the settlor has not restrained the bene-
ficiaries' power of alienation by means of a spendthrift clause, 
there is no restraint on alienation. 
Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
17,1952. 
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